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The main topic of the paper is optimal dynamics, i.e., timing of entry of the 
accession countries in the ERM 2 and EMU. Some of the crucial questions 
addressed in the paper are as follows: a) Should accession countries aim at an 
early or a delayed entry into the EMU? b) What are economic and other 
arguments for an early or late inclusion? c) What are the institutional external 
constraints which may prevent an early inclusion of accession countries?  
 
Institutional rules of the phased process of monetary integration for the accession 
countries are not quite transparent and leave much room for discretion to the EU 
side. In such circumstances it is difficult for the accession countries to devise clear 
and consistent strategies with respect to the timing of entry in the ERM 2 as an 
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  II Dynamics of Inclusion of Accession Countries into the  




This paper focuses on some institutional aspects of monetary integration process for the 
accession countries in their run-up to the euro adoption, with the final aim to contribute to 
the debate on the optimal dynamics of inclusion of these countries in the euro area. 
Institutional aspects are here understood as mechanisms, rules and procedures which the 
accession countries have to follow on the road to the euro area.1  
 
The rules and procedures for the monetary integration of accession countries are defined by 
the EU side (this term is used here as a shortcut expression for relevant EU institutions, such 
as the EU Commission and the ECB - European Central Bank). Accession countries simply 
have to follow these rules and procedures which from their point of view are externally 
determined. In other words, they can not influence them, so they see them as an external 
institutional constraint. In the process of negotiations with the EU these rules and procedures 
were presented as a part of the aquis communautaire and as a part of the whole EU accession 
package, which resulted in an asymmetric position of “take it or leave it” when “joining the 
club”. 
 
Within this context the paper concentrates particularly on the ERM 2 (Exchange rate 
mechanism 2) as a specific institutional arrangement for the accession countries in the interim 
period from their EU accession to their adoption of the euro. At this very moment it is the 
right time for the accession countries to define their strategies towards joining the ERM 2 - 
should they aim at an early entry in the ERM 2, as soon as possible after their EU accession, 
or should they rather wait and postpone the membership in the ERM 2 into the future? The 
paper aims at shedding some light on the underlying open issues and at contributing to some 
arguments which may help to define an ERM 2 strategy for an accession country such as 
Slovenia.  
 
                                                 
1   An institutional approach to monetary integration process of accession countries is emphasized in Lavrač 
(2002b). 
  1 The paper starts from the three phases of monetary integration designed from the EU side 
for the accession countries. The focus of the paper is on the ERM 2 as a central institutional 
framework of the second phase. Main technical characteristics of this mechanism are analysed 
and some open issues identified. The question whether the ERM 2 as a waiting room before 
the adoption of the euro is a stable or a dangerous institutional arrangement is addressed 
next. After discussing the optimal dynamics of inclusion of the accession countries in the 
euro area, some suggestions for defining an ERM 2 entry strategy for these countries are 
given. Finally, before concluding, the paper touches upon the issue of real convergence and 
its impact on the dynamics of inclusion of the accession countries in the euro area.  
 
1.  Phases of monetary integration for the accession countries 
1.1 Three phases of monetary integration 
The EU side sees the process of euro adoption of accession countries as the final phase of 
their process of economic and monetary integration with the EU.2 The process of their 
monetary integration is divided in the three distinct phases: 
 
The first phase, the pre-accession phase, from now on until their EU accession in May 2004, 
still leaves much room for independent monetary and exchange rate policy to the accession 
countries. In particular, they can choose their own exchange rate arrangements which they 
prefer.3 However, they have to fulfil the Acquis Communautaire in the area of EMU 
(economic and monetary union), such as making their central banks independent and 
completely liberalising their capital flows. Also, they have to share the aims of EMU, which 
means they have to join the euro area when they are ready. In other words, they can not opt 
out of the euro as some current EU member countries did.  
 
The second phase, the accession phase, starts with their EU accession in May 2004 and lasts 
until they finally adopt the euro. The duration of this phase is at this moment hard to predict, 
it could be at minimum two years or considerably more. In this phase exchange rate policies 
of accession countries become the matter of common concern.  
 
                                                 
2    Position of the EU side is defined in European Commission (2000) and European Central bank (2000). 
3    Their current exchange rate arrangements and policies are discussed in more detail in Bolle (2002) and 
Lavrač (2002). 
  2 This relatively vague phrase means that the independence of their exchange rate policies will 
be somewhat constrained. Their exchange rate policies should not be harmful to other 
member countries (such as competitive devaluations) or to the smooth functioning of the 
single market (such as excessive volatility of their exchange rates). Also, their overall 
economic policies will be the matter of common concern, which means subject to 
surveillance and co-ordination procedures. Accession countries are expected to join the ERM 
2, although not necessarily immediately after their EU accession. Finally, in this phase 
accession countries should devote their efforts to meeting the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, which should qualify them for joining the euro area. Their central banks will in this 
phase be included in the ESCB (European system of central banks) and their governors will 
join the General council of the ECB.  
 
The third, final phase is the euro phase when accession countries, after meeting the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, join the euro area and adopt the euro as their own currency. 
From then on, they will participate in the euro area with equal rights and obligations as any 
other euro area members. Their central banks will be included in the Eurosystem and their 
governors will join the Governing council of the ECB.  
 
As discussed above, for the accession countries the rules and procedures are prescribed  by 
the EU side. They do not have much room for manoeuvre and more or less have to follow 
them step by step. It seems that the only substantial choice they have at this moment is their 
decision on the timing of joining the ERM 2 and perhaps on the intensity of their efforts to 
meet the Maastricht convergence criteria and thus to have on their part some influence on the 
timing of their inclusion in the euro area. However, it should be reminded that there is 
another option for the accession countries to by-pass these rules and procedures and to speed 
up their joining the euro area: an unilateral adoption of the euro i.e. euroisation. For various 
reasons this option is not acceptable to the EU side.4 It is true that the EU side could not 
really prevent a unilateral euroisation, but would most likely retaliate somewhere along the 
way. For this and other reasons an unilateral euroisation is at the moment not very seriously 
considered among the accession countries, they rather concentrate on their preparations for 
the participation in the ERM 2 some time after their EU accession.  
 
                                                 
4 Why unilateral euroisation is not acceptable to the EU side is analysed in Begg et al. (2002). 
  3 1.2 ERM 2 as a waiting room for the adoption of the euro 
In the process of monetary integration of accession countries particular attention should be 
devoted to the ERM 2. This part of the text is focused on the ERM 2 and discusses its aims, 
rules, characteristics, open issues and its relation to the dynamics of inclusion of accession 
countries in the euro area.  
 
ERM 2 is an interim exchange rate mechanism, devised for the so-called pre-in countries, EU 
member countries which are not yet ready for joining the euro area. By participating in this 
interim exchange rate arrangement for at least two years, the member countries should 
demonstrate the stability of their exchange rates and thereby fulfil the criterion on exchange 
rate stability as one of the five Maastricht convergence criteria.  
 
Participation in the ERM 2 is in principle voluntary. But if we take into account that joining 
the euro area is sooner or later mandatory for accession countries, and that participation in 
the ERM 2 for at least two years in order to fulfil the Maastricht exchange rate stability 
criterion is a necessary precondition for joining the euro area, it turns out that participation in 
the ERM 2 is actually mandatory. The part which is in fact voluntary is only the decision 
when to join the ERM 2, or to be more precise, when to apply for an ERM 2 membership.  
 
ERM 2 came into being in the beginning of 1999 when EU countries entered the third stage 
of the EMU and introduced the single currency, the euro. Although it was not devised 
specially for accession countries, they will obviously be its main “clients”. In a way, ERM 2 is 
partly modelled on its forerunner, ERM, which ceased to exist in the beginning of 1999, and 
in fact substituted it, although it has to be said that their characteristics are rather different. 
Although this goes beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that the experience of 
the EU member countries in participating in the ERM prior to their euro area membership 
and particularly the experience of some EU member countries in participating in the ERM 2 
after 1999 could be helpful in assessing some open issues and problems of this exchange rate 
mechanism which may have a crucial impact on the dynamics of inclusion of the accession 
countries in the euro area. Among four EU countries which did not join the euro area in the 
beginning of 1999, the UK and Denmark negotiated an opt-out from adopting the euro, 
while Sweden and Greece did not fulfil the Maastricht convergence criteria, Sweden formally, 
by not wishing to participate in the ERM beforehand, and Greece actually, by failing to fulfil 
  4 any of the five convergence criteria. In terms of their membership in the ERM 2, the UK and 
Sweden decided not to participate, while Denmark and Greece participated in it from the 
beginning. Greece succeeded in fulfilling the Maastricht convergence criteria in two years and 
joined the euro area as the twelfth country in the beginning of 2002. It seems that the 
experience of Greece from participating in the ERM 2 may be particularly relevant for the 
case of accession countries in their run-up to the euro adoption.  
 
It should be mentioned that when the EU countries were assessed for their readiness to adopt 
the euro, some of these countries were assessed in the Convergence reports by the EU side as 
meeting the Maastricht convergence criterion on exchange rate stability, although at the time 
they had not been actually participating in the ERM for two years, but somewhat less (the 
case of Italy and Finland). The question remains whether such a discount would be given also 
to an accession country claiming an equal treatment, which seems most unlikely.  
 
ERM 2 is basically a system of a fixed exchange rate. It is meant to be a training ground for 
pre-in countries in which they should learn to live with a fixed exchange rate system before 
finally completely and irrevocably fixing the exchange rate or, in fact, giving up the national 
currency and the exchange rate altogether when adopting the euro. However, the exchange 
rate in the ERM 2 is not completely fixed, there is relatively much room for the flexibility of 
the exchange rate in line with the rules and characteristics of this specific exchange rate 
arrangement. From a broader perspective, ERM 2 as a waiting room for the euro adoption is 
meant to be an exchange rate arrangement which should lead to exchange rate stability, while 
allowing for necessary flexibility of the exchange rate in the interim period. Later on, an 
opposing view will be presented, which sees the ERM 2 as a potentially dangerous exchange 
rate arrangement, which may not be as flexible as claimed and which may lead to exchange 
rate instability and even to currency crises. 
 
Until recently, the ERM 2 was defined as a consistent mechanism, whose rules and 
procedures should apply to all member countries uniformly. Lately the concept of the ERM 2 
was somewhat broadened. ERM 2 is now understood as a broader framework, which can 
include several exchange rate regimes from the spectrum of alternative exchange rate 
arrangements actually in use in individual accession countries. Most of the current exchange 
rate regimes of these countries are now seen as consistent with the ERM 2 requirements. The 
only exceptions are floating exchange rate regimes, crawling pegs and exchange rates pegged 
  5 to a non-euro currency. In other words, hard peg regimes such as currency boards are 
acceptable as a unilateral stronger commitment to exchange rate stability. The idea is for those 
countries which already now rely on hard pegs as an exchange rate arrangement to avoid 
double switch from their hard pegs to somewhat more flexible ERM 2 arrangement and then 
back to complete fixing of the exchange rate at the time of the adoption of the euro.  
 
Contrary to the ERM, which was a multilateral exchange rate arrangement among each pair of 
the participating EU currencies, the ERM 2 is a bilateral exchange rate arrangement between a 
currency in question and the euro. The central role in the ERM 2 is therefore given to the 
ECB.  
 
1.3  Characteristics of the ERM 2 and some open issues 
Let us now review some technical characteristics of the ERM 2. Broadly speaking, ERM 2 is a 
specific system of a fixed exchange rate. In the broader public this is often approximated and 
in fact wrongly understood as if a country entering the ERM 2 was actually fixing its exchange 
rate, which is not the case. 
 
The central exchange rate which is the official exchange rate of the currency in terms of the 
euro is determined. The level of the entering central rate is agreed upon in the process of 
negotiations between the EU side and the country in question. In general, the central rate 
should be sustainable and it should reflect the underlying equilibrium exchange rate which 
means the currency should neither be overvalued nor undervalued. The question remains how 
to determine the equilibrium exchange rate. There are various approaches to this (purchasing 
power parity rate, fundamental equilibrium exchange rate, behavioural equilibrium exchange 
rate, etc.),5 but none of them can be indisputably be accepted as the right one. Ideally, the 
entering central rate should also be the final conversion rate to the euro at the time of the 
euro adoption.  
 
The standard band around the central rate of +/- 15% is available, but a narrower band of 
+/- 2.25% can also be negotiated with the EU side. Within this margins, the market exchange 
rate can freely move around the central rate. On the margins, however, mandatory unlimited 
intervention from both sides, the ECB and the central bank of the country in question, is 
                                                 
5 These and other technical issues are analysed in more detail in Borowski et al. (2002). 
  6 required in order to keep the market exchange rate within these prescribed limits. The ECB, 
however, can refrain from such interventions if it was considered to be against its primary 
goal of price stability in the euro area. In the case of lasting one-sided pressures on the 
exchange rate which would manifest themselves in the persistence of the exchange rate on 
either the upper or the lower margin of the band, the central exchange rate could be 
realigned, i.e. corrected, by a devaluation or a revaluation of the currency. Later in the text 
some open issues related to the characteristics of the ERM 2 are discussed.  
 
Membership in the ERM 2 is open only to the EU countries. This means that the accession 
countries can not join the ERM 2 before they are formally admitted to the EU. Does it mean 
that they can join the ERM 2 at the time of their EU accession or immediately after? This is 
not clear at the moment. ERM 2 is an intergovernmental agreement and is not founded in the 
EU Treaty. There are no clearly defined criteria for the participation in the ERM 2 such as the 
Maastricht convergence criteria for the adoption of the euro. Actually, new entrants first have 
to apply and finally have to be assessed as ready to join the ERM 2 by the EU member 
countries, the ECB and the EU Commission. In the period of preparations the candidate 
country must start with informal discussions in which it announces its goals in terms of the 
entry date, the central rate and the width of the intervention band. These issues have to be 
negotiated with the EU side before the actual application for the ERM 2 membership is 
presented and the country is accepted in the ERM 2.  How long all this may take is hard to 
predict, but a guess would be around half a year and up to one year. The earlier preparations 
start, the sooner after the EU accession the ERM 2 membership can be expected. However, 
since formal application can be presented only after the EU accession, and some of the 
formal procedures can start only then, it can realistically be expected that a candidate country 
can not join the ERM 2 immediately after the EU accession. It is true that in the case of the 
Austrian entry in the ERM 2 it took them only a couple of days after their EU accession to 
join the ERM 2, but this can be considered a special case, as its currency was effectively tied 
up to the German mark in an informal unilateral monetary union with the Germany. In the 
case of the accession countries their acceptance in the ERM 2 will probably take longer. 
Slovenian monetary authorities for instance expressed their intention to enter the ERM 2 
early, as soon as possible, but for technical and logistic reasons assume this should happen in 
the beginning of 2005, i.e. good half a year after the Slovenian EU accession.  
 
  7 Although essential formal rules of the ERM 2 are rather precisely defined, some ambiguities 
and uncertainties concerning its actual operation in practice still remain. These uncertainties 
originate not so much from the ERM 2 per se, but mostly from the fact that the ERM 2 is the 
basis for the assessment of fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criterion on the 
exchange rate stability. This criterion states that in order to demonstrate the exchange rate 
stability, the currency of the country in question must participate for at least two years in the 
ERM 2, while keeping the exchange rate within normal bands of fluctuations around the 
central rate and without devaluations of the currency taken at the initiative of the country in 
question. In the official assessment of fulfilment of this criterion, which will be given in the 
Convergence reports by the ECB and the EU Commission, only formal compliance with the 
ERM 2 rules may not be enough. Actually, some qualitative aspects of the exchange rate 
policy will most likely also be taken into consideration in order to assess factual stability of the 
exchange rate. This gives room for discretion to the EU side in the assessment of the 
compliance with the Maastricht exchange rate stability criterion and causes ambiguities and 
uncertainties with respect to how the exchange rate policy actually should be conducted in 
practice within the framework of the ERM 2. Some of the problems and open issues with 
respect to the interpretation of the rules and procedures of the ERM 2 are the following: 
 
a)  How unconditional and unlimited is the intervention on the margins of the band around 
the central rate? In principle, both sides, the country in question and the ECB, should 
intervene at the upper or the lower margin of the band in order to keep the market 
exchange rate within the prescribed band. For the country in question the potential for the 
intervention on the bottom of the band is limited by the extent of its foreign exchange 
reserves, while the limits for the intervention on the upper margin of the band may be 
determined by potential inflationary consequences of the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves. For the ECB the limits for the intervention are set by the fact that it 
can withdraw from this intervention if it was considered to be against its main objective, 
the price stability in the euro area. Obviously this gives much room for discretion to the 
ECB to decide when this should be the case. Additionally, available funds which are 
allocated for such interventions to defend the currencies of the individual accession 
countries are according to available information very limited and thus not sufficient to 
protect the exchange rate in the case of a serious speculative attack on the currency. 
 
  8 b)  How actively can intramarginal intervention be used? In principle, the exchange rate 
should be market determined, which would exclude intramarginal intervention. Would a 
country be allowed to manipulate its exchange rate with the intramarginal intervention, in 
which circumstances and to what extent, these issues remain open for the moment. In the 
extreme case of no intramarginal interventions, within the band we would practically have 
the situation of free floating. In the other extreme case of a strong intramarginal 
intervention, the situation within the band would be close to managed floating. 
 
c)  How intensively realignments of the central rates in the ERM 2 will be used? In the one 
extreme, central rates should be corrected often, always in the case if the exchange rate 
would hit the top or the bottom of the intervention band and stayed there for a while. In 
the other extreme, there would be no corrections of the exchange rates at all and 
interventions at the margins of the band would take care of bridging the temporary 
problem. The issue of course is who and how should determine whether a one-sided large 
deviation of the market exchange rate from the central exchange rate is a temporary or a 
more lasting phenomenon? 
 
d)  Are devaluations and revaluations of the central band to be treated symmetrically or not? 
According to the rules and procedures of the ERM 2 both devaluations and revaluations 
are allowed and at least in principle in fact encouraged in the case of serious one-sided 
deviations of the market exchange rate from the central rate of a more or less persistent 
character. But according to the Maastricht convergence criterion on the exchange rate 
stability a country should not devalue the currency at its own initiative. Does this mean 
that a country can revalue but not devalue its currency? Although at first sight it may seem 
so, actually a country can also devalue. First, it can devalue if this was mutually agreed with 
the ECB. In this case this would not be a devaluation at its own initiative and would 
therefore probably not be considered as a violation of the Maastricht exchange rate 
stability criterion. Second, a country can devalue its currency on its own initiative, but in 
this case counting the two years period participation in the ERM 2 according to the 
Maastricht exchange rate stability criterion starts probably from that date anew. With 
revaluations there are no similar problems. Obviously there is an asymmetry between 
devaluations and revaluations in the practical operation of the ERM 2, but at this point it is 
hard to say how strong this asymmetry will actually be.  
 
  9 From the above it can be seen that there is a grey area of ambiguity and uncertainty around 
the interpretation of the rules and procedures of the ERM 2 and its practical operation as well 
as around the practical interpretation of the Maastricht criterion on the exchange rate stability. 
This nontransparency gives the EU side additional discretion, while for the accession 
countries it complicates their decision making when trying to define their ERM 2 strategies.  
 
2.  ERM 2 – a stable or dangerous mechanism? 
 
According to the EU side, the ERM 2 is a stable but flexible exchange rate arrangement, 
which should be beneficial for the accession countries as a waiting room in the interim period 
before they become ready for adopting the euro. There is also an opposing view, which sees 
the ERM 2 as a potentially dangerous exchange rate mechanism which instead of preparing 
the accession countries for the soft lending in the euro area may actually lead to financial 
crises, divert these countries from their path towards the euro and postpone their joining the 
euro area into indefinite future.6  
 
It should be remembered that the ERM 2 is basically an adjustable peg type of the exchange 
rate system. As such, it belongs to the so-called intermediate or soft peg exchange rate 
regimes, which proved to be at least potentially most unstable, vulnerable and dangerous. Any 
soft peg exchange rate regime can be exposed to speculation, if markets decide to test the 
willingness and ability of the central bank to protect the official exchange rate which 
speculators find not to be sustainable. In the case of the ERM 2 in particular it is not clear 
how far the ECB and the central bank of an accession country would go in defending the 
central rate so the markets may be tempted to test it. Pessimistic scenario could be the 
following: Net foreign capital inflows characteristic for the accession countries already now 
and expected to grow further substantially when convergence play sets in before their 
expected EU and euro area accession will push the market exchange rate to the top of the 
intervention band.7 While the intervention on the upper margin of the band can prevent a 
revaluation of the currency for a while, continued speculative pressures may finally result in 
the correction of the exchange rate. In the meantime, additional capital inflows may overheat 
the economy and make the fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria even harder.  
                                                 
6   Stability of the ERM 2 arrangement and its vulnerability are analysed in Begg et al. (2002) and Folsz (2003). 
7   A detailed analysis of the capital inflows and their relations to exchange rate policy is given for the case of 
Slovenia in Caprirolo and Lavrač (2001). 
  10 On the other hand, if the market sentiment suddenly changes, for good reasons (economic 
fundamentals in the country) or bad reasons (contagion effect from  
other countries), situation may get completely reversed. The exchange rate may hit the lower 
margin of the band and finally result in a devaluation of the currency. Under such a scenario, 
for which the ERM 2 arrangement does not offer a credible protection, it is clear to see why 
the ERM 2 can turn out to be a dangerous waiting room for the accession countries. It is 
obvious that under such circumstances the stability of the exchange rate would not be 
demonstrated, the fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria would be endangered, and 
the accession countries would deviate from their path to the euro adoption and postpone 
their joining the euro area into indefinite future. Therefore, from the point of view of the 
accession countries, their first best strategy would in fact be not to join the ERM 2 at all. 
However, as this strategy is not an available option if they want to adopt the euro at some 
point, the second best strategy for them would be to stay in the ERM 2 for as short as 
possible, i.e. for two years only.  
 
The accession countries if asked would probably rather avoid the ERM 2 arrangement 
altogether. They did not ask for it, did not help design it and see it as an externally given 
constraint, which unfortunately they can not avoid. They tried in some ways to by-pass it 
anyway. Slovenia for instance in the negotiations with the EU on the acquis communautaire 
in the EMU chapter at first in fact asked for an exemption from the ERM 2 participation, 
arguing that the factual exchange rate stability should do for demonstrating compliance with 
the Maastricht exchange rate stability criterion. Of course, as the ERM 2 was already a part of 
the acquis at that time, such an exemption could not be granted, particularly to just one 
country. Also there were some claims, particularly in the academic literature, that the 
accession countries could be admitted to the ERM 2 earlier, even before formally becoming 
the member countries of the EU. However, again this was considered to be against the formal 
rules of the EU. Perhaps the only way to avoid the participation in the ERM 2 is to wait and 
see what happens if the UK (and Sweden) finally decide to join the euro area. Would the UK, 
after its obviously painful decision to finally adopt the euro, be willing to participate for at 
least two years in the ERM 2 and to let its currency be tested in this potentially dangerous 
mechanism? This would most likely be the result of negotiations and balance of political 
powers. However, if the UK had been exempted from the ERM 2 participation, on the 
ground of the “same rules” principle it would be hard to make a case for forcing the 
accession countries to go through this mechanism.  
  11  
3.  Dynamics of inclusion of accession countries in the euro area  
 
Although there are some differences among individual accession countries’ positions, in their 
pre-accession programmes they as a group expressed the intention to join the euro area as 
soon as possible.8 That on the one hand reflects their preference for an early adoption of the 
euro, but on the other hand also reflects the fact that they recognise the institutional 
constraints set by the EU side which prevent them from joining the euro area earlier, perhaps 
even at the time of their EU accession or somewhat later, as some of the accession countries 
planned still just a couple of years ago. The EU side is less optimistic about an early adoption 
of the euro for the accession countries. Although the rules for the new entrants are the same 
as for the current members of the eurozone, for the accession countries as the transition 
economies the concept of real convergence was introduced a couple of years ago, which may 
have an effect on the dynamics of inclusion of accession countries in the euro area. Some 
open issues concerning the concept of real convergence are discussed later in the text. 
 
The attitude of the EU side in fact somewhat changed over time. At first the EU side did not 
clearly define its position, so the accession countries more or less had to guess how they 
would join the euro area and when they should expect to adopt the euro.9 Later on, around 
2000 the EU side defined its position and presented the three-phased approach to the euro 
adoption for the accession countries. At the same time the EU side signalled to the accession 
countries some pessimistic assumptions concerning their readiness for joining the euro area, 
from which it could be understood that their monetary integration could be a rather lengthy 
process. It was implicitly suggested that the adoption of the euro could  not realistically be 
expected after just the minimum period of two years in the ERM 2 waiting room, but most 
likely after an additional period of maturation. Furthermore, it was explicitly mentioned that 
perhaps even the ERM 2 membership should not be expected immediately or relatively 
shortly after the EU accession. In the last year or two, the signals coming from the EU side 
are somewhat less clear.10 Now it somehow seems as if both options, an early or a delayed 
                                                 
8   This can be seen in their pre-accession programmes. For the evaluation of the monetary and exchange rate 
parts of their pre-accession programmes, see European Commission (2003). 
9   For an early discussion on the dynamics of inclusion of the accession countries in the European monetary 
union, see De Grauwe and Lavrač (1999). A more recent analysis of the topic is presented in Gros et al. 
(2002) and Backé and Wojcik (2002). 
10   The attitudes of the EU side can be discerned from the speeches by its high officials, such as Padoa-Schiopa 
(2002) or Solbes (2003) and from the European Central Bank (2003). 
  12 entry in the euro area were in fact open and as if it was mostly in the hands of the accession 
countries themselves to decide the outcome, depending of their efforts to successfully meet 
the required entry preconditions. The rules and procedures for joining the euro area for the 
accession countries are formally defined, but their interpretation and application remains 
somewhat non-transparent, which gives some discretion to the EU side. Perhaps the EU side 
now waits for the right moment to see how things evolve before defining its position more 
precisely.  
 
As mentioned, the accession countries in general expressed their intention to join the euro 
area as soon as possible. Slovenia for instance in its official documents expressed its ambition 
for an early adoption of the euro. There are several reasons behind the ambition of the 
accession countries for an early adoption of the euro. Without going into much detail the 
following should be mentioned: 
 
a)  If a country expects net benefits (more benefits than costs) from the adoption of the euro, 
and accession countries obviously expect net benefits, it should start collecting these net 
benefits as soon as possible. 
 
b)  With the adoption of the euro, a country gets out of the potentially dangerous intermediate 
exchange rate regime of a soft peg in the ERM 2, so it should aim at an early entry in the 
euro area. In the ERM 2 a country can be exposed to speculative attacks on its exchange 
rate, while not having sufficient lines of defence against it. In the euro area it is protected 
from these risks (although, of course, other risks emerge). 
 
c)  On the first sight it may appear that delaying the euro adoption is beneficial for an 
accession country, since it gives it more time for preparations, structural reforms and other 
required adjustments in the economy. However, buying additional time may not always be 
productive, it may just delay the necessary reforms and adjustments, the momentum for 
positive efforts may be lost, etc. In the accession countries very low inflation rates have 
been reached recently. Can this be sustained for a longer period or the trend may start to 
diverge? The fiscal situation has worsened (not only) in the accession countries. Extending 
the period before the adoption of the euro may therefore lead to more and not necessarily 
only to less problems with meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria.  
 
  13 d)  There are also political and prestigious reasons from an early participation in the euro area, 
particularly from the viewpoint of an individual accession country. Obviously they are not 
co-ordinating their euro area and ERM 2 entry strategies, nor are encouraged by the EU 
side to do so. It is also not very clear at this moment whether the accession countries will 
be admitted to the ERM 2 and to the euro area really individually according to their 
individual merits, or in some kind of packages or in a convoy approach as it turned out to 
be the case with the EU accession. It is politically important and prestigious to be the first 
or in the group of the first countries to join the ERM 2 and/or to adopt the euro. This can 
also have an economic effect. Suppose that in the extreme case all accession countries 
except one decided to enter the ERM 2 and the euro area as soon as possible, while the 
last one would decide for a more careful wait and see approach. The credit rating agencies 
would probably be suspicious about such a country, markets would see it as a strange case 
and could start avoiding it.  
 
4.  Defining an ERM 2 entry strategy for the accession countries 
 
Even if we take an ambition of the accession countries to join the euro area as soon as 
possible for granted, at this moment it is difficult for them to formulate a rational and riskless 
ERM 2 entry strategy. Unfortunately there is no more time for delaying the decision. Taking 
into account the fact that the informal preparations for the ERM 2 entry take some time, they 
should start right now if they have an ambition to join the ERM 2 as soon as possible, i.e. 
immediately or shortly after the EU accession. The accession countries should therefore 
already by now have defined their basic ERM 2 strategy, i.e. decide on an early or a delayed 
entry in the ERM 2. This is obviously not a simple decision, since there are at least two kinds 
of important uncertainties involved in this decision-making. First, as argued earlier in the text, 
the rules and procedures of the ERM 2 are somewhat undefined. This non-transparency gives 
quite some room to the EU side for the interpretation and application of the ERM 2 rules 
and procedures. Second, it is not clear when the EU side will actually want to admit the 
accession countries to the euro area. Will on the basis of equal rules treatment for the 
accession countries  the fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria be enough, or some 
additional preconditions such as real convergence requirements or other administrative 
obstacles will be introduced just to delay the process?  From today’s perspective it is hard to 
give a definite answer.  
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The accession countries should probably define their ERM 2 strategy from the starting point 
that the ERM 2 is a potentially dangerous mechanism, which does not necessarily lead them 
to a smooth fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria and to the swift and soft 
lending in the euro area. Since it seems they can not avoid the ERM 2, their best interest is to 
try to stay in the ERM 2 as short as possible, which means for the minimum period of two 
years only. But this starting point still does not answer the question whether it is better to join 
the ERM 2 early or later. There are risks involved in both cases, and the accession countries 
must weigh between both kinds of risks.  
 
The risks of an early entry in the ERM 2 are related to the fact that the accession countries 
now can not in advance know with certainty whether they will be able to get out of the ERM  
2 and join the euro area in just two years. This has to do with their ability to fulfil the 
Maastricht convergence criteria in time (which means practically immediately after joining the 
ERM 2, because of the fact that the assessment of the compliance with the convergence 
criteria has to be done at least half a year before joining the euro area, and is based on the 
previous year’s data) and with the actual willingness of the EU side to admit the accession 
countries to the euro area without additional preconditions. In the worst case scenario the 
accession countries would join the ERM 2 but could not get out of it for a number of years. 
They would get stuck in the ERM 2, remain exposed to dangers of speculative attacks, 
experience exchange rate volatility and perhaps even financial crises, lose momentum and 
diverge from meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria, thus postponing their entry in the 
euro area into indefinite future.  
 
The risks of a delayed entry in the ERM 2 are related to the fact that in this case a country 
also at least proportionally delays its adoption of the euro. This more cautious wait and see 
approach gives more time for necessary preparations and adjustments, but as argued above 
additional time is not always a guarantee for successfully meeting the Maastricht convergence 
criteria later. It seems that this strategy would make sense only if accession countries were 
pretty sure that realistically they could not expect their joining the euro area before a longer 
period, say before 2010. It this case it would perhaps make sense to postpone the ERM 2 
membership to just two years before this date, in order to stay in the ERM 2 for as short as 
possible period. A somewhat cynical remark would be that an advantage of a delayed entry in 
  15 the ERM 2 could also be that in this case by that time the ERM 2 may already have 
disappeared, although this does not seem very realistic.  
Although the accession countries obviously can not avoid the risks, weighing both risks it 
seems that their preference should be for an early entry in the ERM 2. This way they leave the 
door open for an early inclusion in the euro area. They should try to stay in the ERM 2 for as 
short a period as possible to avoid unnecessary additional vulnerability. At the same time they 
should take care of complying with the Maastricht convergence criteria, and pressure the EU 
side to apply the equal rules treatment for joining the euro area to the accession countries in 
such a way as to effectively enable their early entrance in the euro area just after two years of 
their participation in the ERM 2.  
 
Accession countries also have to watch each others’ strategies. Not knowing the EU side 
reactions and other accession countries’ strategies, formulation of an optimal ERM 2 entry 
strategy for an accession country becomes a kind of complicated game theory problem. 
 
5.  Real convergence issue 
 
Finally, a few words about the real convergence should be added. The EU Treaty defines only 
the Maastricht convergence criteria as the precondition for joining the euro area.  This so-
called nominal convergence was applied to the EU countries when they adopted the euro and 
on the assumption of equal rules treatment it should also suffice for the accession countries. 
Real convergence was introduced as a concept somewhat later, probably to give the EU side 
additional discretion to delay the process of inclusion of the accession countries in the euro 
area if they fulfilled the Maastricht convergence criteria relatively soon. In this case the EU 
side would have no arguments and instruments to keep the  accession countries outside the 
euro area for a while, if their early adoption of the euro was considered to be too risky from 
the point of view of the EU side.  
 
Real convergence is not precisely defined, which gives additional room for interpretation and 
discretion. No specific quantified indicators for the real convergence which could be applied 
for the assessment of readiness of the accession countries for joining the euro area have been 
presented so far. However, it can also not be completely excluded that they could emerge in 
time. The idea is that apart from the nominal convergence real convergence should also be a 
  16 precondition for the adoption of the euro and that it should be pursued in parallel or in fact 
even before the nominal convergence. The concept of real convergence is rather vague. 
Usually it is meant as the catching up in the economic development (GDP per capita level) 
with the EU average, or finishing the process of transition and related structural reforms 
which would make the transition economies more similar to the EU member countries.11 
 
Although there is nothing wrong with accession countries’ efforts to speed up their real 
convergence process, the real convergence should not be used as a precondition for joining 
the euro area for the accession countries. The catching up process can take many years or 
decades, structural reforms are never really finished, and transition countries will still remain 
somewhat different from the present EU member countries at least for a while. The real 
convergence should not be used as an excuse and as an instrument for keeping the accession 
countries outside the euro area into indefinite future. At the bottom of the issue is the 
question: Is a monetary union possible among countries at a different level of economic 
development? Obviously yes, although it might be easier to run a monetary union with 
member countries at the same level of economic development, which in practice never 
happens. The history of different monetary unions, the euro area itself and some EU member 
countries which conditionally speaking can be looked upon as “monetary unions” between 
their more and less developed regions, demonstrate that the functioning monetary unions 
have to and can live with differences in the economic development among their member 
countries.  
                                                 
11  More about the nominal and real convergence can be found in Lavrač and Zumer (2003). 
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The accession countries expressed their ambition to join the euro area early, as soon as 
possible. In the process of their monetary integration they face some external institutional 
constraints. In the first place, after their EU accession and before their adoption of the euro, 
they have to participate in the ERM 2 for at least two years. The paper finds the ERM 2 a 
potentially dangerous institutional mechanism. Instead of being a stable and flexible 
arrangement leading to their soft lending in the euro area, it may lead to financial crises, 
difficulties in meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria and to postponing their adoption of 
the euro into indefinite future.  As the accession countries have to go through the ERM 2 for 
at least the minimum period of two years anyway, they should try to make their participation 
in the ERM 2 as short as possible, i.e. limited to two years only. When formulating their ERM 
2 entry strategies, the accession countries should be advised to decide for an early 
participation in the ERM 2, more or less immediately after their EU accession, although this 
is also not a riskless strategy. The overall message of the paper is that there should be more 
transparency, equal rules treatment and less discretion in the hands of the EU side in the 
process of monetary integration of accession countries, which could make the formulation of 
their optimal ERM 2 and euro area entry strategies much easier. 
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